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Habeas Corpus: Its Importance, History, and Possible Current Threats
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Senior Honors Project

Abstract: One of the greatest protections against tyranny to ever develop within

the common law was the powerful writ of Habeas Corpus. Unfortunately, this
writ sometimes causes inconvenience to the executive's attempts to enforce the
law, especially during times of war, leading the government to be tempted to
suspend the writ for insufficient reasons. This paper endeavors to explicate the
importance of the writ of habeas corpus, examine a current suspension of it, and
show why that suspension has been based upon insufficient constitutional
grounds. Finally, this paper closes by examining some of the dangers inherent
in this unjustified revocation of habeas corpus.

The common law's ancient writ of Habeas Corpus is one of the most important
defenses available against tyranny. Habeas Corpus, translated literally from Latin, means
"you have the body." By issuing a writ of habeas corpus, a judge or court may compel
those holding a prisoner to produce the prisoner and prove that they have legally
incarcerated the individual.

This power is an important check against an inordinate

concentration of power in the executive branch as it allows the jUdiciary to challenge
illegal detentions which have always been favorite tools of intimidation used by dictators
and despots throughout history. Because of the importance of this writ, even a legitimate
abridgement of this power or of the right to petition it should be met with a highly critical
eye and subjected to the most stringent standards of evaluation.
In the current "war on terror," certain actions by the Bush administration have
been debated in both the Congress and the courts, and have led to a limited suspension of
the habeas corpus rights of some people detained in military operations and anti-terrorism
investigations. The greatest number of the prisoners in question is the group of men
being held at the United States military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When it became

apparent that there was no plan to release any of these men at a definite future date,
petitions for writs of habeas corpus were filed on behalf of this group. The outcome of
this case, and subsequent cases, has led to the passage, in late September of this year, of
the Military Commissions Act of 2006. Among the many provisions of this bill is a
provision which declares that "No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear
or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained by the United States"l if that alien meets certain conditions prescribed by the
bill. As with any suspension of habeas corpus, this instance should cause us to pause and
carefully question the constitutionality of this action.
In order to begin examining the constitutional legality of this act, it is important to

review the development of the modem concept of habeas corpus in order to understand
this writ and its importance. The American doctrine of habeas corpus finds its origin in
the common law which was brought to this country from England. In his commentaries
on the Laws of England, Sir William Blackstone credits the origins of the principles
behind the writ of habeas corpus to the ancient Saxons who conquered England shortly
after the Roman Empire withdrew from the British Isles. 2 Blackstone said that the great
importance of the writ of habeas corpus lay in its protection of the liberty of individuals.
According to Blackstone, all men were endowed by God with three great rights: the right

1 Military

Commission Act 2006, Section 7, e (17 October 2006).

2 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 4 (Chicago, The University of
Chicago Press, 1979),435.

to personal security, the right to liberty, and the right to property. The entire aim of
society and government was to protect these three rightS. 4
Because these rights were so fundamental, Blackstone said that they could not be
taken by force, even for the sake of the public good, but only willingly surrendered by an
individual or by his representatives. 5 This was why, according to Blackstone, only
parliament, being a body representative of the people, could legitimately pass laws that
would lead to the incarceration of individuals, and parliament was also the only body
which could legitimately abridge the right of British subjects to petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. 6 As proof of these assertions, Blackstone offered the Magna Carta's
declaration that "No free man shall be seized or imprisoned ... except by the lawful
judgement of his equals or by the law of the land."7 He also cites the parliament's
passage of "that great bulwark of our constitution, the habeas corpus act,',8 as the
parliament's assertion that neither the king, nor any other executive could in any wise
revoke the right to petition and receive a writ of habeas corpus.
When the United States' Constitution was conlposed, the founding fathers
ensconced this writ and its common law protections in the first article of the Constitution,
not even wanting to wait until after the constitution was ratified as they did with every
other right which is listed and protected in the Bill of Rights. According to the first

3 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (Chicago, The University of
Chicago Press, 1979), 125.
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Magna Carta, Clause 39, 1215.
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Sir William Blackstone, vol. 4, pg. 431.
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article, section 9 of the United States Constitution, "The privilege of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may
require it." By placing this provision in the first article of the constitution, the founders
allowed only the Congress to hold the power to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus.
Even then, they severely limited this power by the statement that it should never be
exercised except when national safety demanded it in cases of insurrection or invasion,
thus setting a very high standard which any such abridgment of this writ must meet.

In spite of the clarity of both the common law and the United States' Constitution,
the writ of habeas corpus has not always been well respected or heeded. Still the courts
have resisted these abuses and used them as opportunities to state, painfully clearly, the
bounds of executive authority over the writ. Perhaps the worst and most dramatic of
these abuses occurred during the Civil War. During the war, many northern Democrats
opposed the Lincoln administration's actions as unconstitutional and wrongfully
aggressive. These "Peace Democrats," or "Copperheads" as their opponents called them,
would oppose the war both with speeches in legislative gatherings and in public, and by
organizing demonstrations and protests against the war and the draft. Because these
Democrats were causing so much disruption, the Lincoln administration began having
them arrested by the military and held either without trial or held and tried by a military
court. This was accomplished by President Lincoln's declaration of Martial Law in many
areas and his unilateral order that the privilege of habeas corpus was suspended.
This situation came to the attention of the courts early in 1861 in the case of John
Merryman. According to the opinion Ex parte Merryman, John Merryman was arrested
without a warrant at two o'clock in the morning on the 25 th of May in 1861. Merryman

was then held without trial in Fort McHenry under charges for which neither proof nor
accusers were offered. When Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, then sitting on the Circuit
Court for Maryland, issued a writ of habeas corpus, the commanding officer of the fort
informed him that President Lincoln had suspended habeas corpus and that John
Merryman would not be delivered to the court.
In response to this arrogant usurpation of the legislature's sole authority to
temporarily suspend habeas corpus, Justice Taney issued his opinion Ex parte Merryman.
In this opinion, the justice traced the common law origins of habeas corpus, showing that
it was always held that only the Parliament could suspend the writ; He also noted that this
was the plain understanding of the Constitution's provision of when congress might
suspend the writ. The Justice then went beyond simply demonstrating that the suspension
of habeas corpus was a legislative issue and began to show why it should never be an
executive one. He did this by listing and discussing some of its past abuses in England
during such times as the English Civil War. He then memorably concluded that:
"No one can believe that, in framing a government intended to guard still
nlore efficiently the rights and liberties of the citizen, against executive
encroachment and oppression, they would have conferred on the president
a power which the history of England had proved to be dangerous and
oppressive in the hands of the crown; and which the people of England
had compelled it to surrender." 9
Unfortunately, the Lincoln Administration and its army ignored this decision, as
well as many similar, subsequent decisions which ordered it to cease these illegal arrests

9

Taney, Roger B.: Ex parte Merryman, Apri11861.

and incarcerations. For the next two years, Lincoln asked Congress to pass measures
authorizing his suspension of habeas corpus, but Congress refused to do so. Eventually,
in 1863, the Congress passed such an act, baptizing Lincoln's longstanding illegal actions
with an air of Constitutional legitimacy. 10

In 1866, after the war had ended, the Supreme Court heard and decided the case
Ex parte Milligan. This case dealt with the trial and conviction of Lambdin P. Milligan
and his accomplices who had been arrested after the passage of the 1863 act, and who
had been tried by a military court.

The opinion in this case stated that while the

detentions were legal at the time of the arrests and during the war, the trials of Milligan
and his associates were illegitimate because they were conducted by military courts
which did not have jurisdiction over civilian citizens because, in spite of the declaration
of martial law, the normal court system was still functioning. I I While explaining this
decision, the court also stated that during the war, the revocation of the writ of habeas
corpus was permissible because questions of public safety "did not allow that calmness in
deliberation and discussion so necessary to a correct conclusion of a purely judicial
question," but that "now that public safety is assured, this question, as well as all others,
can be discussed and decided.,,12 This case, therefore, is considered to be the decision
that reinstated habeas corpus after the war.
After the Merryman and Milligan cases, while there were some mInor
developments in the doctrine of habeas corpus, mostly dealing with procedural questions
such as the applicability of the writ to prisoners taken and held outside the territory of the
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United States, there were few major disputes until after the attacks of September 11 t\
2001.
In the months following this terrorist attack, the United States invaded the country

of Afghanistan, then ruled by the Taliban movement's jihad sanctioning government. In
the course of this invasion, many prisoners were taken. Those who were deemed to be
the most valuable to the United States' struggle to destroy the al-Qaeda terrorist network
were taken to the Military Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. These detainees were not
classified as prisoners of war because the Bush administration did not wish to have to
abide by the regulations of the Geneva Conventions as they related to such prisoners, or
to try them according to the rules of a formal military court marshal. Neither did the
administration wish to try these men in the civilian court system where standards of
evidence would make a conviction doubtful without ruining the effectiveness of the
nation's evidence-gathering apparatus. The administration, therefore, declared that these
prisoners were anew, third type of prisoner which they termed "illegal enemy
combatants." These "illegal enemy combatants" were then claimed to have no rights
under either the laws of the United States or under the Geneva Conventions.
The Bush administration might have continued holding these men indefinitely had
not petitions for writs of habeas corpus been made on their behalf. The result of these
petitions, in time, was the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Shafiq Rasul, et al. v.
George W. Bush. In this case, the Bush administration argued that the United States'
court system did not have jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus for the Guantanamo
prisoners since the base at Guantanamo Bay was, according to the technical wording of
the treaty which leased the land to the United States, still the property of Cuba. The

Court maintained, in this case, that it still held jurisdiction over the habeas corpus rights
of detainees at the Guantanamo base because the United States still exercised "exclusive
jurisdiction and control" over the base. I3 Because the Supreme Court had held that
United States Courts did have the jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus cases, the Bush
administration sought to create a way to try the detainees which would meet both its
desire for convictions and the court's probable demands for due process.
In 2005, the administration obtained passage of the Detainee Treatment Act of

2005. This act set very loose rules on the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo and
other facilities as well as authorizing the defense department to come up with rules for
organizing military tribunals to try detainees. I4 The bill also attempted to prevent the
courts from challenging its legitimacy by declaring that no United States courts or judges
would have jurisdiction to hear petitions for writs of habeas corpus. 15
This law received its challenge in 2006, soon after it was passed, when the
Supreme Court heard the case of Salim Ahmed Hamdan v. Donald H. Rumsfeld. Salim
Hamdan is a Yemeni who was captured in Afghanistan and held at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. He was one of the first who was selected to be tried by military tribunal. Hamdan
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was being held illegally and
tried contrary to the laws of war. Rather than examine the legitimacy of the Detainee
Treatment Act's revocation of Guantanamo detainees' habeas corpus rights, the Supreme
Court held that they had jurisdiction to hear the Hamdan case because it was already

13

Justice Stevens, Rasul v. Bush, 28 June 2004.

14 National Defense Authorization Actfor Fiscal Year 2006, Title 10 (Detainee Treatment Act of 2005),
Section 1005, (6 January 2006).
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pending when the Detainee Treatment Act took effect and the habeas corpus provision of
that act was not written to be retroactive. The Court then declared that the Military
Commissions were unconstitutional, as they had been constituted, because they had been
organized by and had their rules written by the Defense Department rather than by the
Congress, and because their procedures and charges were different from those sanctioned
in either the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or the Geneva Conventions.
In response to this decision the Bush administration pushed Congress for speedy

passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. This act attempted to take care of
each of the reasons that the Supreme Court gave for its Hamdan decision. First, it clearly
defined the new status of "illegal enemy combatant" and described the process for
determining if any non-citizen detainee could be classified as SUCh.I6 The bill also set up
the exact procedures and standards for the operation of military commissions to try illegal
enemy combatants and defined a new set of charges which would be available for such
commissions to try.I7 The act also declared that the Geneva Conventions could no longer
be invoked in any habeas corpus action against the United States or any personnel in its
employ. 18

Finally, the act sought to insure that no court could ever challenge the

detentions of these "illegal enemy combatants" by declaring that:
"No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained by the United States who has been determined by the United
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Military Commission Act 2006, Section 2 and 3.
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States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or

IS

awaiting such determination.,,19
Such a broad declaration, if accepted by the Court, makes it impossible for United States
courts to hear almost any habeas corpus petition from a non-citizen detainee since all that
government lawyers would need to do is claim that the detainee was awaiting a military
comnlission's determination that he or she was an "illegal enemy combatant." This is,
therefore, far more broad than simply revoking the habeas corpus rights of a small group
of internationals. In effect, this bill revokes the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
from any non-citizen of the United States that the government wishes to hold because it
simply takes a word to declare that a person is eligible to be stripped of this right.
To evaluate the legality of this decision we must first evaluate whether noncitizens of the United States may be properly considered to be beneficiaries of the
protections provided by the privilege of habeas corpus. Because the right of habeas
corpus is so vital to the protection of liberty-the second of the great, inalienable rights
of all men listed by not only William Blackstone, but also by our own Declaration of
Independence-we may guess that the founders may not have intended it to be limited to
citizens only. Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that the Constitution does not
differentiate between the habeas corpus rights of citizens or aliens. Furthermore, even if
the founders intended some type of separation in these rights, the Fourteenth Amendment
would seem to extend the protection of this right with its statement that no state shall
"Deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

19

Military Commission Act 2006, Section 7, e.

hl addition to these Constitutional arguments, United States Code's division 28,

section 2241 formally grants the judicial branch the authority to grant writs of habeas
corpus in certain cases involving foreign nationals.

Finally, and of the most recent

importance, the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Rasul v. Bush declared that the
Supreme Court saw a constitutional, statutory, and common law precedent for granting
the protection of the privilege of habeas corpus to non-citizens within the bounds of the
territory of the United States.
Because the Constitution, as well as the laws of the land and the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Constitution all seem to agree that non-citizens are protected by the
privilege of habeas corpus, we must now evaluate whether the privilege itself was legally
revoked. According to the first article of the United States' Constitution, section 9, "The
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of
rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it."

As was noted in ex parte

Merryman, the first requirement of this section, by virtue of its logical placement within
the first article of the Constitution, and within that article's list of limits on the power of
the legislature, is that the legislature alone may revoke the right of habeas corpus. This
first requirement has been met in the case of both the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
and the Military Commissions Act of 2006 as the revocation of habeas corpus in both
instances was authorized by the legislature rather than ordered by the President.
The second and explicit textual requirement of Article 1, Section 9 is that the
legislature may exercise its power only in cases when insurrection or national invasion
make such a suspension a necessity of national safety. When it comes to determining the
necessity of an action, such as the public need of a taking, the tendency of the Supreme

Court has been increasing deference to Congress. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the
Court will attempt to take up the question of the appropriateness of the Congress's
decision that there is currently a state of invasion which necessitates this suspension of
habeas corpus. In spite of this likely deference to Congress, such an evaluation remains a
legitimate line of inquiry about the constitutionality of this present suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus.
Supporters of the Military Commissions Act will argue that national safety
requires this abridgement of rights because the United States is trying to fight a kind of
invasion. These people argue that this invasion, while being of a hidden and insidious
nature, is being conducted by an unknown number of terrorist cells. They argue that the
only way to stem this invasion is to detain suspects long enough to determine whether
they are a threat and then to hold them until they cease to be such threats. To further
justify such a determination that the United States is under a state of invasion, supporters
of this bill will likely point to the fact that these cells are not only supported by the
infrastructure of the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, but also encouraged by small nations
which have the goal of boosting their national power relative to that of the United States.
By virtue of these arguments, supporters of the Act will claim that the United States is
suffering from a hidden, but real invasion, the threat of which justifies this exercise of
power by the legislature.
Opponents of this act, however, will likely counter these arguments by saying that
describing this present conflict as an invasion of the nation is a misnomer. These people
would point out that even the terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda do not have the
type of coherent goal that would define an invasion by a foreign nation. Instead, these

are simply loose associations of wicked men who wish to murder American civilians for
goals which vary from breaking our will to support Israel to gaining personal salvation.
Although these terrorists claim to all be bound in one organization, they are, in reality,
many separate individuals and groups, each of which will be replaced by another once
renloved. These isolated, ideologically motivated groups will likely continue attempting
to attack the United States for years into the future, attacking in a random and haphazard
pattern resembling the workings of a common criminal rather than in a way that could be
considered part of a concerted effort to invade the United States. Thus, it can be argued
that since these attacks are not part of a concerted, coherent invasion, they should not be
treated or opposed as such by suspending the privilege of habeas corpus.
As can be seen from the arguments on both sides of this issue, whether the actions
of groups such as al-Qaeda qualify as an invasion of the United States resolves, in large
part, to a semantic argument over what constitutes an invasion, whether it be the simple
literal definition of foreign nationals trying to gain entry to a country to do it some harm,
or a nlore nuanced definition that examines the goals and organizations of these attackers.
This semantic argument places the exact legality of this action in a somewhat undefined,
gray area of the law unless one of these definitions can be decided upon. Ex parte
Milligan offered some the following observations evaluating the appropriateness of the
revocation of habeas corpus by Congress during the Civil War, as well as the Court's
reason for reinstating the right:
"During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did not allow
that calmness in deliberation and discussion so necessary to a correct
conclusion of a purely judicial question. Then, considerations of safety

were mingled with the exercise of power; and feelings and interests
prevailed which are happily terminated. Now that the public safety is
assured, this question, as well as all others, can be discussed and decided
without passion or the admixture of any element not required to form a
legal judgment.,,2o
Later in the Court's opinion, it stated that its reason for striking down the use of military
trials to try civilians during the war was based on the fact that while the war had caused
enough disruption to justify the revocation of habeas corpus, it had not disrupted the
court system to such an extent that it was unable to try cases. 21 Ifwe take these two items
together, they point to the determination that this current conflict does not qualify as an
invasion that would authorize the suspension of habeas corpus because, while there is
some extant threat to the safety of individuals within the United States, this threat has not
disrupted the courts' ability to try cases, or to hear and consider petitions for habeas
corpus from citizens or from non-citizens lucky enough to not be classified as "illegal
enemy combatants."
For these reasons, if the courts were to subject the Military Commissions Act of
2006 to such stringent tests of constitutionality, they would likely come to this same
conclusion: that the law does not fully meet the Constitution's requirement that habeas
corpus only be suspended in times of invasion or insurrection. However, it is unlikely
that the Supreme Court will take up this question since it avoided this issue in its decision
of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, allowing the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005's revocation of
habeas corpus to stand--choosing, instead, to use a loophole in the Detainee Treatment
20
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Act which failed to revoke the habeas corpus rights of prisoners who had already filed
cases with lower courts.
The reason for the court's choice to avoid this topic is likely a result of its
aforementioned tendency to defer to the judgments of Congress. This deference will
likely cause the courts to allow the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to stand unless it
finds some other small loophole through which to challenge the act. Unfortunately, in
this case, such deference is very dangerous, not only for those who will lose their habeas
corpus and other due process rights directly from this bill, but also for the rest of society.
The greatest danger of this act is that if the courts allow this act to stand, its weak
definition of what type of invasion might justify the suspension of habeas corpus will
become legal precedent. This same definition could then be used as authorizing the
suspension of the habeas corpus rights of all non-citizens, and finally of citizens
themselves. It is not likely that such a shift would occur very quickly, but to think that
this definition would not be used to broaden the scope of the suspension of habeas corpus
to include citizens is naIve; such a shift could only require one or two modest sized
terrorist attacks carried out by homegrown terrorists to be widely accepted by the public.
The second danger of this action is that it makes Americans comfortable with the
idea of surrendering rights for a long, possibly endless period of time. From the time of
Blackstone, the suspension of habeas corpus was thought to be only a temporary
suspension,22 never an endless revocation like that which this present law seems to
establish. The very idea of surrendering any right for more than the shortest of temporary
periods should be repugnant to freedom-loving Americans, but because it is not our rights
which we are sacrificing, but rather those of aliens, most Americans are all too
22

Sir William Blackstone, vol. 1, pg. 132

comfortable with this provision. Sadly, the longer Americans live allowing the rights of
others to be impinged indefinitely, the more easily they will relinquish their own hardwon rights for indefinite periods of time. When this tendency is combined with the risk
of defining invasion too loosely, the result could be the complete loss of all habeas corpus
rights in the space of a couple of decades.
Such a loss of the privilege to petition for a writ of habeas corpus would doubtless
be the harbinger of tyranny since this writ is the last peaceful defense of personal liberty.
It is therefore vital that we carefully evaluate this act and any other attempt to limit the

right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Any act that does not fully meet the
standards set forth in the Constitution should be opposed vigorously, for to do otherwise,
even if we only surrender the rights of a small group of non-citizens, is to gamble for
marginal benefits in public safety using the precious capital of the liberty of future
generations; generations which would be forced to live in whatever tyranny we might
accidentally create to protect ourselves.
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